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581 
ABOLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Mark Tushnet1 
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: 
The constitutionality of acts of Congress shall not be reviewed 
by any court in the United States.2 
COMMENTARY 
1. Source: The proposal is adapted from Article 120 of the 
Constitution of the Netherlands: “The constitutionality of Acts 
of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts.”3 
2. Scope: (a) “any court in the United States”  
The proposed amendment would apply to all courts (other 
than international courts located physically in the United States, 
should there happen to be any), those established under the au-
thority of the United States (the federal courts including courts 
established pursuant to Congress’s authority under Article I and 
subject to scope note (b)(ii) below) and state courts as well. 
(b) “acts of Congress” 
(i) The proposed amendment would not in general bar 
courts from determining that actions by executive officials vi-
olate the Constitution.4 The courts could of course hold execu-
 
 1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I have taken 
a relatively limited approach to the Symposium’s charge. (A broader approach would 
take the Essay’s organizing question to be: Why bother to interpret the Constitution to 
advance the cause of socialism if you can rewrite it to do so?) I thank Jill Hasday, Louis 
Michael Seidman, Girardeau Spann, and Adrian Vermeule for comments on a draft of 
this Essay. 
 2. Alternative language: “No court in the United States shall have the power to 
hold unconstitutional any act of Congress.” 
 3. It is surely relevant to the provision’s operation in the Netherlands that its Con-
stitution contains another provision which states: “Statutory regulations in force within 
the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with treaties that are 
binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.” GW. § 94.  
 4. In addition to the executive actions discussed in the text, this limitation means 
that agency decisions and regulations could be reviewed for their constitutionality as well 
as for their consistency with the agency’s organic statute and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. I would expect that it would be rare for a court to find unconstitutional a regu-
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tive action unauthorized by statute. In addition, they could take 
constitutional values into account in determining whether a spe-
cific executive action had been authorized by Congress, and hold 
the action unlawful (“unconstitutional,” in a slight adaptation of 
existing usage) in the absence of sufficient authorization. Fur-
ther, they could adjust their assessment of the sufficiency of sta-
tutory authorization in light of their assessment of the 
importance of the constitutional values implicated in the case. 
They might require that certain kinds of executive action be spe-
cifically authorized in quite express terms by congressional 
enactment.5 But, importantly, expressly authorized executive ac-
tion would not be reviewable for consistency with the Constitu-
tion.6 
(ii) The proposed amendment would not preclude Congress 
from enacting the entire Constitution or portions thereof as a 
framework statute, and from authorizing the courts to determine 
whether some subsequent enactment is consistent with the “sta-
tutory Constitution.”7 Should the courts find a statute inconsis-
tent with the statutory Constitution, Congress would retain the 
power to reject their interpretation (of the statutory Constitu-
tion) by expressly amending the statutory Constitution to make 
its statute effective notwithstanding the courts’ interpretation of 
the statutory Constitution.8 
 
lation implicitly but not explicitly authorized by the organic statute, because the more 
obvious path would be to find the regulation insufficiently authorized in light of the con-
stitutional concerns it implicates. 
 5. At the limit, they could require that detentions of individuals without judicial 
process be authorized by congressional legislation identifying by name the persons to be 
detained. 
 6. Perhaps I should emphasize that the fact that Congress might expressly author-
ize actions that courts exercising the power of judicial review would find unconstitutional 
is a feature, not a bug. I sketch the argument for why this feature is attractive below, text 
accompanying notes 14–16. 
 7. The statutory Constitution could contain a provision stating that it should con-
trol the interpretation of later-enacted statutes in the absence of an express statement in 
such statutes that they were to displace all provisions in the statutory Constitution. 
 8. A modest problem of interpretation might arise were a litigant to contend that a 
later-enacted statute effectively amended the statutory Constitution, though not in ex-
press terms. The argument would take the form of asserting that the conflict between the 
later-enacted statute and the statutory Constitution is plain, that the later-enacted statute 
would have no significant effect were it to be found in conflict with the statutory Consti-
tution, that Congress should not be taken to have enacted an ineffective statute, and that 
the later-enacted statute should for that reason be taken as an amendment to the statuto-
ry Constitution. I personally am inclined to think that this argument is a good one, and 
that it would place some pressure on courts to reconcile the later-enacted statute with the 
statutory Constitution, by an aggressively limiting interpretation of the former or an ag-
gressively modest interpretation of the latter. Others might think, though, that the courts’ 
application of clear-statement rules would counsel against accepting the argument. Given 
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(iii) The proposed amendment would not apply to legisla-
tion enacted by state legislatures or to municipal ordinances. 
Were Congress to disagree with a judicial determination that 
some state statute or municipal ordinance violated the Constitu-
tion, it would have the effective power to enact a statute making 
the state statute or ordinance legally effective within the jurisdic-
tion that adopted the statute or ordinance. And conversely, were 
Congress to disagree with a judicial determination that a state or 
local statute did not violate the Constitution, it would have the 
power to enact a (national) statute denying legal effect to the 
state or local statute (and presumably though not necessarily all 
similar statutes in other jurisdictions).9 
(iv) The proposed amendment would not allow the defen-
sive use of constitutional objections. Assume that Congress 
enacts a criminal statute that a court would find unconstitutional 
because it violates the First Amendment, were the court to en-
gage in its own analysis of the legal materials relevant to deter-
mining whether a statute violates that Amendment. The 
proposed amendment would bar the court from engaging in that 
independent analysis (except insofar as relevant to interpreting 
 
the possibility of congressional response, the issue is less significant that it might other-
wise be. 
 9. The proposed amendment would insulate such congressional legislation from 
review for its constitutionality, thereby rendering irrelevant the jurisprudence associated 
with questions about Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to define the scope of constitutional rights (in this context, determining that a state 
statute or local ordinance did not violate constitutional rights as Congress defines them). 
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1968) (Congress may forbid practices that 
are not themselves unconstitutional provided the law is aimed at preventing or remedy-
ing constitutional violations); id. at 651(“[Section Five is] a positive grant of legislative 
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what 
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). But cf. 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress may enact legisla-
tion that remedies constitutional violations, but may not create new substantive rights 
not guaranteed by the Constitution). Put another way, the proposed amendment’s appli-
cation solely to congressional legislation rests on a strongly nationalist view of national 
power in our federal system (a view that, in my own judgment, is prescribed by Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). Members of Congress would of course have to consider 
whether they had the power under the Constitution as they understood it to enact such a 
statute, and their deliberations might be informed, though not controlled, by pre-
amendment jurisprudence. 
In operating in this manner, the proposed amendment would generalize from the 
power Congress has under currently prevailing interpretations of the Commerce Clause, 
see, e.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (“When Con-
gress . . . chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitu-
tional attack under the Commerce Clause.”) to authorize states to enact legislation that 
would violate the so-called dormant Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional 
authorization. 
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the statute). The court would be required to allow trial to pro-
ceed and to remit a convicted defendant to executive custody.10 
DISCUSSION 
The proposed amendment is modeled on a provision in the 
constitution of the Netherlands, but it is not a simple transplant 
from that constitution. The United States and the Netherlands 
differ along many dimensions relevant to institutional design and 
modification: size, degree of heterogeneity among the popula-
tion,11 political structures such as federalism, the use of a parlia-
mentary or a separation-of-powers system in organizing the 
legislative and executive branches, the electoral system, and per-
haps the ideological and political predispositions of the political 
elite. Yet, the Netherlands is recognizably a reasonably well-
functioning liberal democratic state.12 Its refusal to allow judicial 
review of national legislation establishes an “existence” proposi-
tion that that sort of judicial review is not necessary for a state to 
be a reasonably well-functioning liberal democracy.13 
 
 10. Individual judges may be uncomfortable remitting defendants to executive cus-
tody, so much so as to raise questions for them about continuing to hold office. Judges 
may be similarly uncomfortable with respect to setting an even partially discretionary 
sentence in such a case. 
 11. However, although the Netherlands is more heterogeneous than one might in-
itially think. According to the Dutch census bureau, approximately 80% of the people of 
the Netherlands are “ethnic Dutch.” See Population: sex, age, origin and generation, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/default.aspx?DM=SLEN&PA=37325eng&D1= 
0&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0-1%2c84%2c102%2c139%2c145%2c210%2c225&D6= 
a&LA=EN&HDR=G2%2cG3%2cG4%2cT&STB=G1%2cG5&VW=T (last visited Oct. 
9, 2010). Whites in the United States are also roughly 80% of the population. See T-3 
2006: Race; 2006 Population Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census. 
gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-state=dt&-ds_name=PEP_2006_EST&-CONTEXT=dt&-
mt_name=PEP_2006_EST_G2006_T003_2006&-redoLog=true&-_caller=geoselect&-
geo_id=01000US&-geo_id=NBSP&-format=&-_lang=en (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 12. Of course the Netherlands is not a perfectly well-functioning liberal democracy, 
but then neither is the United States. Nor does it matter that some features, including the 
specification of particular constitutional rights, of the Netherlands’s version of liberal 
democracy differ from the parallel features in the United States version; both versions 
are situated well within the boundaries of the class of liberal democracies. 
 13. One qualification to this assertion might be that the Netherlands is part of the 
European human rights regime, and its national legislation is subject to scrutiny by that 
regime’s institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Yet, the actions of 
those institutions—unlike those of the European Court of Justice—have no direct effect 
within the Dutch legal system. Janneke Gerards & Hanneke Senden, The Structure of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 619, 
638 n.74 (2009) (“[T]he ECHR, different from EC law, does not have direct effect in the 
states parties.”). See also NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend 
& Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1 (establishing principle of 
direct effect for rulings of the European Court of Justice). In one sense those institutions 
function as civil-society institutions monitoring domestic compliance with international 
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The proposed amendment recognizes a fundamental feature 
of the U.S. Constitution: Nearly all of its terms, and for all prac-
tical purposes all of the terms that generate the kind of dispute 
that leads to judicial review, are subject to reasonable alternative 
interpretations.14 The U.S. system of judicial review rests on the 
proposition that the interpretation found more reasonable than 
alternatives by judges prevails over reasonable interpretations 
found more reasonable by Congress. That is a specific institu-
tional arrangement that, in my view, has never been successfully 
defended against criticism. It certainly does not flow from a con-
ceptual analysis of terms like “law,” “supreme law,” “Constitu-
tion,” and the like—as, again, the example of the Netherlands 
shows.15 
This Essay is of course not the place to develop all the (to 
me persuasive) criticisms of the U.S. institutional arrangements 
for enforcing the Constitution. Three deserve brief mention, 
though. I state them dogmatically, with equally dogmatic res-
ponses.  
(1) Judges as experts in the law. The Constitution is law, sta-
tutes are (mainly) policy embodied in law. Judges are good at in-
terpreting the law, legislators are not as good. But: (a) The 
Constitution is a special kind of law, in the interpretation of 
 
human rights norms, and doing away with judicial review in the United States would not 
eliminate the ability of civil-society institutions to perform a similar function here. The 
ECJ has begun to enforce fundamental human rights within its jurisdiction, and those 
decisions do have domestic legal effect within the Netherlands. See Andrea Bianchi, 
Security Council's Anti-terror Resolutions and Their Implementation by Member States, 
2006 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 45 (2006) (“In the absence of any provisions in the constitutive 
treaties concerning the protection of human rights, the European Court of Justice had to 
elaborate by itself a judicially-made human rights doctrine.”). This practice might be 
thought to weaken the “existence” proposition that I use the Netherlands to establish. In 
that case I would probably revert to the example of the United Kingdom before the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, although I would thereby lose the textual 
model the Netherlands Constitution provides.  
 14. This is not to say that every individual will find all available interpretations 
equally reasonable, but rather to say only that some people who are unquestionably reason-
able people deploying the available tools of legal interpretation in well-recognized ways 
will find one interpretation more reasonable (“better”) than another, while other people, 
with the same characteristics of rationality and use of recognized interpretive tools, will 
fund a contrary interpretation more reasonable. 
 15. Most defenses ultimately end up with the assertion that the Constitution is su-
preme law, that judges are the institutional actors who regularly determine what the law 
is, and that they have the power to interpret the Constitution in the course of applying 
the law. The flaw in the argument, familiar from the beginning, lies in the assumption 
that the judges’ interpretation of the Constitution necessarily determines what the law 
“is” in some ontological sense. There are of course pragmatic reasons, addressed in the 
text, for giving judges some role in constitutional interpretation, but that role would not 
be eliminated by the proposed amendment. 
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which politics and policy properly play a role. The advantage 
judges have over members of Congress may well be smaller in 
constitutional interpretation than in other areas of law. (b) Con-
gress could develop institutional mechanisms to improve its ca-
pacity to engage in expert constitutional interpretation, and 
might do so as a by-product of the proposed amendment’s adop-
tion.16 The proposed amendment might give Congress incentives 
to enact as statutes rules that some would think constitutionally 
problematic, and doing so might in turn give Congress incentives 
to revise its internal procedures so as to bring the constitutional 
discussion to the surface. 
(2) The burdens of inertia. Judges are required to address all 
constitutional complaints addressed to them in proper form, 
whereas Congress has no similar obligation. True, but insuffi-
cient to establish that the U.S. institutional arrangement, where 
judges’ constitutional interpretations prevail over Congress’s al-
ternative reasonable ones, is necessary to enforce constitutional 
limitations,17 given the possibility allowed by the proposed 
amendment that courts will construe statutes in light of constitu-
tional values or will be called upon to enforce a statutory Consti-
tution.18 And, just as Congress might develop institutional 
mechanisms to improve its capacity as the proposed amendment 
moves toward adoption, so too might it find enacting a statutory 
Constitution attractive as part of the amendment process. 
 
 16. For a discussion of such mechanisms, see Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, 
Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001). 
 17. One perhaps important exception is for cases in which the constitutional com-
plaint is that Congress has failed to perform some duty the Constitution imposes on it to 
enact legislation. In light of the prevailing view that the U.S. Constitution is one of nega-
tive rather than positive rights, the number of such cases (about the U.S. Constitution, 
not about all possible constitutions) is likely to be quite small. One can imagine situations 
in which Congress failed to perform one of its duties, for example by enacting a statute 
that suspended an election for the House of Representatives, or for one-third of the Se-
nate, or even for the presidency. (I thank Jill Hasday for the example.) But: (a) other 
reasonably democratic nations have gone through suspensions of regularly scheduled 
elections without damage to their democratic credentials (most notably, Great Britain 
failed to conduct a regularly scheduled election in the middle of World War II), and (b) 
were Congress to (unreasonably and solely to preserve its own power) suspend an elec-
tion, the nation would be in such deep doo-doo that it would be foolish to think that the 
relevant legal actors—here, the members of Congress itself—would comply with a Su-
preme Court decision finding the suspension unconstitutional. 
 18. The enactment of a statutory Constitution might—but need not—lead to a 
recreation of judicial review of the sort the United States now has, through the following 
sequence: enactment, judicial interpretation of the statutory Constitution, development 
of a practice of congressional acquiescence in those interpretations, and the hardening of 
that practice into a convention against any statutory responses to judicial interpretations 
other than those that accept the courts’ interpretations. 
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(3) “Distortions” in congressional constitutional interpreta-
tion due to politics and vote-getting. Congressmembers’ incen-
tives to take the Constitution seriously arise solely from their 
incentives to be re-elected, and so are derivative of their consti-
tuents’ interests in taking the Constitution seriously. Those in-
terests may be weak, and in any event are likely to be diluted by 
the fact that constituents must vote for or against a candidate 
who offers them an indivisible package of positions, only one of 
which will be the degree of the candidate’s commitment to tak-
ing the Constitution seriously. Again, true enough. But (a) the 
difficulty lies in establishing that the incentives to take the Con-
stitution seriously, which for present purposes I concede to be 
weak, are so weak—particularly when aggregated through the 
institutional processes of law-making—as to result in enacted 
legislation that falls outside the range of laws permitted by some 
reasonable constitutional interpretation, as compared to the 
judicial incentives to uphold legislation that falls outside the 
range of reasonable constitutional interpretations. And (b) in my 
experience objections based on distorted incentives typically in-
volve claims about statutes the questioner expects to be enacted 
because of the distortion, and dislikes on the merits, without se-
rious consideration of whether such statutes might nonetheless 
be supported by reasonable constitutional interpretations (with 
which the questioner disagrees, of course). 
The proposed amendment would convert the U.S. Constitu-
tion from what British constitutionalists call a legal constitution 
into what they call a political one.19 Political constitutionalism 
rests on, but also contributes to, constitutionalist sensibilities 
prevalent in a nation’s people and political elites. Importantly, 
political constitutionalism operates through politics, and so 
through the mechanisms we use to organize our politics—the po-
litical parties as much as, and ordinarily more than, direct partic-
ipation of the people in political activities such as 
demonstrations and politically oriented organizations in civil so-
ciety.20 Perhaps the constitutionalism of the people of the United 
 
 19. For recent discussions, see RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DEMOCRACY (2007); Symposium, The Role of Courts in Constitutional Law, 60 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 1 (2010).  
 20. For this reason I have come to think that political constitutionalism is a better 
term for the phenomenon than the one that has become prevalent in U.S. discussions, 
“popular constitutionalism.” The most careful discussions of popular constitutionalism 
do blend attention to direct participation with the activity of political parties, see, e.g., 
LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
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States has been debilitated by our experience with strong-form 
judicial review, though I personally doubt that, given the wide-
spread presence of constitutionalist rhetoric (much of it uncom-
fortable to me on the merits) in popular discourse.21 But, 
constitutional amendments such as that proposed here do not 
come into effect instantaneously. A political process of public 
education and popular mobilization takes place before a propos-
al reaches Congress, a process that continues while Congress de-
liberates, after it submits a proposed amendment to the states 
for ratification, and in each state as its people considers whether 
to ratify. Just as that political process might generate institution-
al innovation within Congress, so too might it reinvigorate popu-
lar attentiveness to the Constitution. 
Of course there are no guarantees that political constitutio-
nalism will always produce results that I personally favor. In-
deed, each of us would undoubtedly find occasions on which 
political constitutionalism yielded undesirable results as each of 
us evaluates those results. Yet, it should be equally obvious that 
someone will find exactly those same results—the ones that dis-
comfit me or you or your uncle or your neighbor down the 
block—entirely acceptable. As Louis Michael Seidman suggests 
in his contribution to this Symposium, it would be nice (for you 
or me or your uncle) if you or I or your uncle could guarantee 
that the results under any constitutional system would track pre-
cisely the outcomes we like. Because we can’t (that is, because 
what you like, what I like, and what your uncle likes are inevita-
bly going to differ), the absence of guarantees about outcomes 
does not in itself count against political constitutionalism. 
Perhaps not “in itself,” but the real question is a compara-
tive institutional one. How does judicial review stack up on the 
“no guarantees” question compared to how political constitutio-
nalism does? As the preceding paragraph suggests, each of us 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005), but the term itself might mislead readers into disregarding the 
role of parties.  
 21. I think it worth emphasizing the importance of the parenthetical here. Many 
readers of this Essay may think that popular rhetoric about, for example, reinterpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment to deny automatic citizenship to children born in the United 
States of those not lawfully present demonstrates a lack of popular commitment to con-
stitutionalism. My view is that this is simply a disagreement either about reasonable in-
terpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment or about whether the proposed 
interpretation is a reasonable one, not an indication of popular disregard of constitutio-
nalism. (For an argument that a statute denying birthright citizenship under the specified 
circumstances would conform to the Constitution, see PETER SCHUCK & ROGERS SMITH, 
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). I 
note that I find the argument unpersuasive, but not unreasonable.). 
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will have to answer that question with reference to our own val-
ues and preferences without imputing those preferences to some 
objective Constitution “out there” that just happens to track 
what each of us values and prefers. Doing so requires some ra-
ther difficult calculations and assessments.22 All I can say is that, 
for myself, the assessment of the U.S. Supreme Court’s perfor-
mance from 1791 to 2010 is pretty bleak when taken as a whole. 
From my perspective, it’s hard to think that political constitutio-
nalism could have done much worse.23 I think it’s worth a try. 
 
 
 22. The best account of which I am aware of what is needed to answer the compara-
tive question is WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE (2005), reprinting, inter alia, Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the Protec-
tion of Constitutional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002) (arguing that “the 
‘matrix’ of rights-protection in any specific system of judicial constitutional review must 
incorporate two types of calculation. First, it must “compare incidences of the invalida-
tion of ‘wrong’ statutes (on the ‘gains' side) with invalidations of ‘right’ statutes and cases 
of upholding ‘wrong’ statutes (on the ‘losses' side). The second looks at the gains and 
losses resulting from the very existence of the system of judicial review (rather than the 
specific cases that have been upheld or invalidated)”). 
 23. Which is to say, because the ultimate question is a comparative institutional 
one, that the performance of legislatures in the United States from 1789 to the present is 
somewhat less grim. 
